Tools of War: The Northrop P-61 Black Widow

The Northrop P-61 was the first American aircraft designed exclusively for night combat, and though it arrived later in the war, it proved itself a very capable combat aircraft.

by Seth Marshall

The P-61’s design had its origins in 1940, when the British were looking to the US aircraft industry for an aircraft capable of intercepting and shooting down German bombers targeting London with night raids. The U.S. Army Air Corps decided that they too were in need of an aircraft capable of a similar mission. Northrop began designing the night-fighter around a large twin-tail boom design powered by a pair of Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp radial engines, each providing 2,000 horsepower. The fuselage provided space for three crew; a pilot, a gunnery officer, and radar operator. The aircraft was armed with four 20mm cannons mounted in a bay below the cockpit, and four .50 caliber machine guns housed in a turret on top of the fuselage. Most importantly, the new night fighter was designed to carry the SCI-720 AI radar set, which was capable of detecting enemy aircraft in nearby airspace.

After a lengthy period of design, the prototype XP-61 first flew on May 21, 1942. Despite being such a large aircraft, the P-61 proved that it “had very good maneuverability, in part because of the patented spoiler type later control and deceleration/airborne surfaces.”[1] Two years later, after flight testing, the P-61 entered service in Europe with 422nd Fighter Squadron, stationed at Charmy Down, England. Initially, pilots were unconvinced that such a large aircraft would be able to hold its own in aerial combat- a Northrop test pilot travelled to training bases, providing air show demonstrations with the P-61 and proving that the aircraft was more than capable of holding its own in a dogfight.[2] In the end, several squadrons of P-61s in Europe and 8 squadrons of P-61s in the Pacific had taken charge of night-time aerial combat.

A P-61 based in England in 1944.

A P-61 based in the Pacific Theater.

Early experience with the P-61 showed that the top turret of the P-61 caused rough air flow which disrupted normal flight enough that turrets were removed from all P-61As. Most squadrons in Europe would experience shortages of spares, reducing the number of P-61s available for missions. Despite this, European squadrons were assigned not only for night patrols but also night ground attack missions, something that the P-61 proved to be well-suited for, since it was capable of carrying some 6,400lbs of ordnance or extra fuel tanks on its wings. And despite its late arrival in the war, squadrons equipped with the P-61 racked up a number of kills. The 425th Fighter Squadron shot down 10 aircraft along with four V-1 flying bombs, while the 422nd claimed 43 aircraft destroyed and 5 V-1s shot down, making it the highest-scoring P-61 squadron.

In the Pacific, the 6th and 419th Night Fighter Squadrons were the first units in the Pacific to receive the aircraft. By the end of the war, the 6th NFS had claimed 16 kills, making it the highest-scoring P-61 unit in the Pacific. Black Widows were also used for ground attack missions in the China-Burma-India theater, attacking convoys attempting to resupply Japanese units. In the Mediterranean, the P-61 equipped the 414th, the 415th, the 416th, the 417th, and the 418th Night Fighter Squadrons. Of these, only the 414th saw combat, with a detachment from the 414th being sent to Belgium to provide support during the Battle of the Bulge- this detachment claimed 5 enemy planes shot down.[3]

By the end of the war, 941 P-61As,Bs, and Cs had been built, along with 38 F-15 Reporter aircraft, a modified version of the P-61 designed for reconnaissance. P-61 units claimed 109 aircraft shot down in total during the war. After the surrender of the Japanese, P-61s were gradually replaced by the newer F-82 Twin Mustang. Some were used in early ejection seat experiments, while others were used in a large project carried out by the US Air Force to gather information about thunderstorms. The last P-61 was retired in 1953. Today, of the 900+ P-61s and F-15s built, only four remain. P-61B Ser. No. 42-39715 is on display at the Beijing Air and Space Museum. P-61C Ser. No. 43-8330 is on display at the Stephen F. Udvar-Hazy Center of the National Air and Space Museum in Chantilly, Virginia. P-61C Ser. No. 43-8353 is on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio. Finally, P-61B Ser. No. 42-39445 is being restored to flying status by the Mid-Atlantic Air Museum in Reading, Pennsylvania.

The Mid-Atlantic Air Museum's P-61B, which is currently being restored to flying status. Photo credit Mid-Atlantic Air Museum. Photo credit Mid-Atlantic Air Museum.

[1] P. 139- Gunston, Bill. The Illustrated Directory of Fighting Aircraft of World War II. New York: Prentice Hall, 1988. Print

[2] P.11-12 Thompson, Warren E. P-61 Black Widow Units of World War 2. Botley, Oxford: Military Book Club/Osprey, 2000. Print

[3] P.50 Thompson, Warren E. P-61 Black Widow Units of World War 2. Botley, Oxford: Military Book Club/Osprey, 2000. Print

USAAF Tactical Airpower Over Normandy Part II

Large numbers of fighter-bombers roaming the skies over northern France prevented the movement of German supplies and greatly aided in the progress of Allied troops.

By Seth Marshall

                In the first part of this article, I discussed the absence of any real doctrine for tactical airpower at the start of the Second World War. As a result, USAAF officers drew upon tactics used by the RAF and Luftwaffe as a basis for their own doctrine. The Normandy invasion provided one of the first tests of USAAF tactical airpower in combat. With the aid of air-to-ground communications and forward observers, US fighter-bombers were able to target columns of German reinforcements heading to the beaches, causing substantial delays in their progress and inflicting dozens of vehicle losses on them in the process.

While these developments were focused towards making close air support strikes more precise, the largest single use of tactical airpower during the Normandy campaign was not a surgical strike. Operation Cobra, General Omar Bradley’s plan for an Allied breakout from Normandy, called for a large-scale bombardment by hundreds of fighter bombers from the 9th Air Force and heavy bombers of the 8th Air Force in a small target area in the German front lines. On July 24th, the offensive began with the massive barrage. Most of the aircraft dropped their bombs within the target area, but as the bombing progressed, smoke from the explosions drifted, causing the last formations of heavy bombers to drop their bombs short of their targets, causing extensive casualties among American infantry units preparing to move forward.[1] The effects of the bombardment among the defenders were varied. Some German divisions did not receive much damage from the bombings, thanks to well-dug defensive positions. Other units, notably the Panzer Lehr Division, were bracketed by the falling bombs and suffered extensive casualties. However, the Germans were able to create a temporary defensive line which limited the gains the Allied ground forces made on the first day. The following day, another bombardment nearly identical to the first was carried out. Again, the last formation of heavy bombers dropped their bombs shorting, killing more American troops. And just as the day before, the Germans were able to reform their defensive lines. Only a determined assault by an armored division which broke the flank of the German line allowed the rest of the Allied divisions to begin moving forward.

The bombardments which opened Operation Cobra were some of the only instances during the Second World War in which heavy bombers were used for close air support.  These aircraft normally flew at altitudes often exceeding 25,000 feet and in this instance were not used effectively. German units, even those which had sustained heavy bombing, were able to reform their lines successfully on July 24th and were almost able to do so again on July 25th. The bombardment had also encountered a number of problems in the planning stages, not the least of which was that the bombers could not bomb the target area parallel to the lines. This meant that they had had to fly on a path perpendicular to the bomb line, taking them directly over the Allied troops preparing for the offensive.[2] To be sure, the bombers had weakened the defenders to some extent, but the barrage had not created a hole in the German lines as had been expected by the offensive’s planners.

Following the opening of Operation Cobra, heavy bombers returned to their long-range bombing campaign, passing the task of air support over to the fighter bombers of the 9th Air Force. Through July and August 1944, these aircraft provided close air support for advancing Allied columns of troops. The aircraft of choice for these operations was the P-47, the heaviest fighter aircraft built during the war. It was well-suited for ground support missions due to its tough construction and the array of rockets, bombs, and eight .50 caliber machine guns it carried. Both the IX Tactical Air Command and the XIX Tactical Air Command, the two main USAAF units responsible for close air support of American ground forces, were equipped primarily with this type of aircraft.

During the period following the start of Operation Cobra, the rapid advance of ground forces led to a reliance on two tactics favored by the tactical air forces. The first was armored column cover, a system devised by General Quesada. Armored column cover involved the use of tanks equipped with ground-to-air VHF radio communicating with flights of four to eight fighter bombers patrolling over the advancing armor. Pilots could observe enemy forces and relay their positions to the troops, as well as attack German vehicles and positions as requested. The second tactic, known as armed reconnaissance, was created by General Otto Weyland, commander of the XIX Tactical Air Command. In armed reconnaissance, formations of fighter bombers ranged up to 30 miles ahead of the American tank columns, attacking targets of opportunity as they were discovered.[3] With the assistance of tactical air power, tank columns moved so quickly that pilots had to carry regional maps with them in order to know where allied units were located.

General Otto Weyland, commander of the XIX Tactical Air Command during World War II, would later go on to command the Far East Air Forces in the Korean War and Tactical Air Command in post-war years.

The process of providing air support to the ground forces was aided by the close relationship that Weyland had with General George S. Patton, whose 3rd Army tanks were protected by Weyland’s planes. Patton said of Weyland, “No operation in this army is contemplated without General Weyland and his staff being present at the initial decisions. We don’t say that we are going to do this and what can you do about it. We say that we would like to make such an operation, now how can that be done from the air standpoint?”[4] This was a marked difference to the planning of the Cobra bombardment, which had was not remembered for cooperation between the air and ground commanders.

During the latter half of the month of August, tactical air support would reach its zenith  in Normandy during operations to complete the encirclement of German forces in the vicinity of Falaise. Fighter bombers from both the USAAF and the RAF were able to maximize their effectiveness thanks to the large numbers of German vehicles clogging the roads in an attempt to escape the pocket. An aerial strike which typified the kind of fighting taking place occurred on August 13th, near Argentan. Three dozen P-47s from the 36th Fighter Group observed 800 to 1000 vehicles “milling about in the pocket west of Argentan.” After an hour of aerial attack during which 400 to 500 vehicles were claimed destroyed, the fighter bombers returned to base, out of bombs and ammunition.[5] Similar strikes would continue to take place until the pocket was finally closed on August 21st.

The losses for the German Seventh Army as a result of the encirclement at Falaise were staggering. Around 10,000 soldiers were killed, with another 40-50,000 captured. In addition, some 200 tanks, 300 cannons, 700 artillery pieces, 5,000 vehicles, 2,000 wagons, and 1,500 horses were destroyed, many of them by aircraft.[6] Photos from the battle show fields and roads filed with burnt-out trucks and carriages. Despite the scale of devastation, a large number of German troops were able to escape and would later play a critical factor in resisting Allied forces during Operation Market Garden. During the immediate aftermath of the battle though, they had very little equipment. The remnants of seven Panzer Divisions which managed to escape the pocket were able to count only 50 tanks and 60 artillery pieces among themselves when combined.[7]

One of the many roads in the region around Falaise, littered with destroyed and abandoned armor and motor transport.

The large number of destroyed vehicles claimed by fighter bombers during the Normandy campaign has been questioned over the years by historians. Many vehicles in the Falaise pocket and in other locations were later found to have been abandoned by their crews rather than hit by aerial weaponry. According to British historian Ian Gooderson, post-battle analysis conducted by RAF ground teams found that relatively few of the destroyed tanks examined were knocked out by aerial attack, as nothing less than a direct hit from a rocket or bomb would actually destroy them. Additionally, it was found that cannon and machine-gun fire from strafing runs was the main cause of destruction, particularly among soft-skinned motor transport. Gooderson remarks that the large-number of destroyed trucks and other motor transport would have blocked the roads, preventing the escape of armored vehicles and compelling their crews to abandon and burn them before retreating.[8] Finally, the destruction of so many trucks also greatly reduced the availability of the fuel needed to run tanks, forcing more tank crews to leave their armor behind. While Gooderson’s book focuses more on areas target by the RAF’s Typhoon fighter bombers, it seems safe to assume that the results achieved by USAAF P-47s were similar.

Another important result achieved by fighter bombers during the Normandy campaign was the effect on the moral of German troops. German soldiers frequently remarked in after-action reports that it was the presence of close air support which had thwarted their movements and offensives. Gooderson writes in his book that experienced German tank crewmen would become frustrated with their inexperienced comrades, who displayed the tendency to abandon the relative safety of their tanks for ditches and foxholes.[9] The demoralizing effect on German troops was felt even by commanders such as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who himself was attacked by Allied aircraft while in his staff car. Rommel remarked, “The enemy’s air superiority has a very grave effect on our movements. There’s simply no answer to it.”[10] German soldiers collectively feared the presence of the “Jabo” over the battlefield.

The effect of American tactical airpower over Normandy was considerable, though perhaps not in the same way as its commanders initially thought. The huge claims of destroyed vehicles racked up by fighter bombers is difficult to substantiate, particularly with regard to tanks. However, fighter bombers were responsible for causing severe delays in German reinforcements, slowing to the point of only moving at night. They also did destroy enough motor transports to seriously impede the Germans’ ability to fuel their armor. Vehicles destroyed by aircraft also made for excellent roadblocks, a characteristic whose value was maximized during combat in the Falaise pocket, forcing many panzer crews to abandon their tanks in order to escape death or capture. Finally, the psychological impact of close air support on German forces was ruinous, causing the collapse of several offensive operations and the frequent interruption of resupply efforts.

[1] P.253 Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984

[2] P.101 “The Botched Air Support of Operation Cobra”

[3] P. 1 Army Air Forces in World War II." USAAF.net. Web. 13 Sept. 2011. <http://www.usaaf.net/ww/vol5/vol5pg4.htm

[4] P. 183 Spires, David . Air Power for Patton's Army: the XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002. Print

[5] P.37-38 Hallion, Richard P. "Air Power Over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond." Air Force History and Museums Project (1994). Print

[6] P. 245 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. New York: Free, 1995. Print.

[7] P. 245 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. New York: Free, 1995. Print.4

[8] P.119 Air Power at the Battlefront

[9] P. 116 Air Power at the Battlefront

[10] P. 18 Hallion, Richard P. "Air Power Over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond." Air Force History and Museums Project (1994). Print

USAAF Tactical Airpower Over Normandy Part I

Large numbers of fighter-bombers roaming the skies over northern France prevented the movement of German supplies and greatly aided in the progress of Allied troops.

By Seth Marshall

                In July and August of 1944, much of the Allied air forces were dedicated towards strategic bombing attacks on German military, industrial, and civilian targets. The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) used large numbers of heavy bombers with fighter escort to achieve these aims. However, this time period also saw the use of aircraft in the tactical role, providing fire support on or near the battlefield. Operating in conjunction with large numbers of similarly-tasked aircraft from the Royal Air Force (RAF), USAAF aircraft would have a significant impact upon the German Army’s ability to react to the Allied breakout of Normandy, inflicting serious losses among columns attempting to make their way to the front lines and having a crippling effect upon both movement and the psychological state of German troops. This accomplishment was not an easy one, especially considering the overwhelming interwar and wartime popularity of strategic bombing, which impeded the development of tactical airpower.

During the years between the World Wars, the idea that strategic airpower would be the means to end futures wars held sway with most officers in the Army Air Corps. Because of the focus on strategic airpower, little attention was paid to tactical aviation, which was viewed as a lower priority for the Air Corps. This mindset prevailed through the interwar period to the early years of World War II and had an effect on the types of aircraft being created for military use. Numerous bomber and fighter aircraft were designed and built during the interwar period, but relatively few aircraft were created specifically for ground attack missions. Many of these aircraft never made it past the prototype stage, and those that did were generally not produced in significant numbers. As a result, any tactical aviation units operating during World War II would be using existing aircraft designs modified to suit the purposes of ground attack missions.

The start of World War II created an immediate need for tactical aviation units to be used in support of ground forces. However, the focus on the strategic air offensive had resulted in a lack of doctrine, aircraft, and tactics, with the result that the USAAF was completely unprepared for ground attack missions. With no experience of their own, USAAF officers looked the tactical air branches of other air forces for ideas. They drew upon the Luftwaffe’s model, which featured Stuka dive bombers closely supporting advancing armored columns, and upon the experiences of the RAF in Africa and Italy, where heavily-armed fighter bombers worked with air liaisons positioned on the ground to provide the aircraft with information on the location of enemy vehicles. The first USAAF document which featured tactical airpower as its focus was “FM 35-36: Basic Field Manual: Aviation in Support of Ground Forces.” While it was the first of its kind, there were problems with the manual, not the least of which was that it was rejected by ground commanders.[1] Following combat operations in North Africa, a new field manual, FM 100-20: The Command and Employment of Air Power, published in July 1943. This book, which included experiences taken from the battlefields of North Africa, opened with the statement, “Land power and air power are equal and interdependent forces. Neither is an auxiliary of the other. The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset… control of available airpower must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited.”[2]  This first line laid out the command structure that would be used in France. Despite the objections of ground unit commanders, tactical air units would be brought under the domain of a centralized command system, making it easier for air commanders to coordinate larger and more effective strikes of the kind that were used during the Normandy campaign.

When the Allies invaded France on June 6th, 1944, fighter bombers and medium bombers had already been softening up the German defenses for some weeks. Following the landings, these aircraft would be increasingly called upon for close air support, a development which had not been foreseen by the airpower theorists during the interwar period. There were two important factors in close air support’s transformation into one of the primary means of fire support. One was that for months prior to the invasion, Allied bombers had been pounding Luftwaffe bases in France. In an effort to prevent their squadrons in Western Europe from being destroyed and simultaneously bolster defenses in Germany, many Luftwaffe fighter squadrons were pulled back to the Fatherland. [3] Additionally, the lack of an abundance of field artillery early in the invasion caused ground troops to rely more upon air support. In the week following the invasion, U.S. ground units called for close air support on 184 different occasions.[4] Fighter bombers also performed interdiction missions, striking behind the front lines at reinforcements attempting to make their way towards the expanding beachhead. So harassed were German forces that they were limited to only moving under the cover of darkness. An often cited example of one German division which experienced frequent aerial attack was the Panzer Lehr Division, which lost 130 trucks, 84 halftracks, and a handful of tanks. These losses were not necessarily damaging to a division whose peak strength in vehicles was around 3,000, the delays caused by the attacks amounted to several days added in travel time and thereby preventing those reinforcements from reaching the front that much longer.[5]

THE REPUBLIC P-47, THE WORKHORSE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN THE TACTICAL SUPPORT ROLE. THE SINGLE HEAVIEST AIRCRAFT OF THE WAR (AT 10,000 LBS EMPTY), THE P-47 PROVED ITSELF TO BE EXTREMELY CAPABLE OF GROUND SUPPORT. IT WAS ARMED WITH EIGHT .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS AND COULD CARRY 10 5 INCH ROCKETS AND UP TO 2,500 LBS. OF BOMBS, ALMOST HALF THE LOAD OF A B-17 HEAVY BOMBER. WHAT WAS MORE, IT WAS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING INCREDIBLE AMOUNTS OF PUNISHMENT, WHICH MEANT THAT IT COULD MAKE REPEATED ATTACKS ON WELL-PROTECTED TARGETS EVEN IN THE FACE OF HEAVY FLAK. PICTURED HERE ARE P-47CS FLYING IN FORMATION IN 1942.

The first weeks of the invasion also saw the creation the first air-ground communications net, set up during the night of June 17-18 by the IX Tactical Air Command in the area of Au Gay. In this system, a group composed usually of around twelve fighter bombers would take off and fly towards a pre-designated area. Once they were within a few minutes of their target zone, the flight leader would contact an air-ground liason officer with the army unit’s corps or divisional headquarters via radio for updated information. Army units would mark targets on the ground for the fighter-bombers with red smoke for best visualization. Once an attack run had been completed, pilots were to make observations on the results of their attack to the officer on the ground, which would usually be followed with further attack runs in the area or searching for targets of opportunity in the area.[6]

To combat the problem of not having an observer on the front lines who could communicate effectively with the pilots in the air, VHF radios were installed in Sherman tanks specially tasked with observation under the order of Major General Elwood “Pete” Quesada, commander of the IX Tactical Air Command. Quesada, a vocal advocate for the use of tactical airpower, also made the decision to put fighter bomber pilots in these tanks to act as forward air controllers, reasoning that a pilot on the ground would be better able to describe a target to another pilot in the air.[7] This would be the first use of forward air controllers, which would become a staple of tactical airpower during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

Lt. Gen. Elwood 'Pete' Quesada, commander of the IX Tactical Air Command during the war.

The heavy use of tactical airpower as fire support for ground troops during the first month and a half of the Normandy campaign was made possible by both by the development of doctrine during the first years of the war and by advancements such as the creation of air-ground communications and the placement of forward observers, which made air strikes more accurate and effective. As a result, U.S. fighter bombers were able to wreak havoc with German reinforcements, greatly slowing their progress to the frontlines.  However, it would be during the Normandy breakout and the campaign to encircle the German Army in France that the U.S. Army Air Force would distinguish itself as being effective at tactical airpower. This will be covered in the second half of this article.

[1] P. 72 Rife, Shawn P. "Kasserine Pass and the Proper Application of Airpower." Joint Force Quarterly (1998): 71-77.

[2] P. 17 Spires, David N. Air Power for Patton's Army: the XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002. Print.

[3] P. 2 Hallion, Richard P. “The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, D-Day 1944: Air Power Over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond. Air Force History and Museums Program, 1994

[4] P. 149 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. New York: Free, 1995.

[5] P. 151 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. New York: Free, 1995

[6] P. 38-39, 184 Spires, David N. Air Power for Patton's Army: the XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002.

[7] P. 184 Spires, David N. Air Power for Patton's Army: the XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002. Print.

The U.S. Navy & the War of 1812 Part II

Though it was not the first conflict that the still fledgling US Navy had taken part in, the War of 1812 would be the first real test of the Navy’s mettle.

by Seth Marshall

                In Part 1 of this article, I discussed the initial success of the American heavy frigates against the lighter armed fifth-rate frigates of the British Royal Navy, and the Royal Navy’s success with its blockade against the ports along the Eastern Seaboard of the US. Now we turn to naval warfare on the lakes of North America and what the War of 1812 meant for the US Navy.

                While on the Atlantic coast warships remained in port for the majority of the war, the same was not true of naval warfare on the Great Lakes. Here, both sides engaged in building smaller ships for the purposes of troop transport, fire support, and for control of the Lakes. Two relatively high-profile battles occurred in this theater- the Battle of Lake Erie and the Battle of Plattsburgh. The Battle on Lake Erie took place on September 10, 1813 between a fleet of nine American and six British ships. Despite the American advantage in ships, firepower, and men, the British were able to damage several American ships, including Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry’s flagship USS Lawrence. Perry transferred his flag to the brig Niagara and rallied the American fleet to victory. The British defeat on Lake Erie ensured American naval dominance of that lake for the duration of the war.[1] Other lakes were not the scene large navy engagements but did see the buildup of warships by both sides. At Lake Ontario, this buildup culminated in the construction of the HMS St. Lawrence, a 112-gun ship of the line crewed by 700 men. One year after the Battle of Lake Erie during the Battle of Plattsburgh, an American and British fleet again met, this time on Lake Champlain. During this battle, the forces were closer to being even; the Americans had a corvette, brig, sloop, and eleven other smaller ships against a British frigate, three sloops and several gunboats. However, the US Navy ships drew the British into Plattsburgh Bay to bring them within range of the carronades which was the primary armament of the US ships.[2] After a fierce fight, the British surrendered their larger warships while the smaller gunboats retreated. The loss coupled with the British defeat on land halted the British invasion and forced them to pull back. The victory on Lake Champlain occurred shortly before the Treaty of Ghent was signed and was one of the last naval engagements of the war.

The United States' victory at the Battle of Plattsburgh put an end to British-Canadian invasions of the northern U.S. and gave the country a stronger negotiating position at the Treaty of Ghent, which was signed on December 24, 1814, ending the war.

                Despite the lauding of the frigate victories as crowing achievements by some contemporary American popular historians, the US Navy was not ultimately victorious in the War of 1812. Over the course of the war, the Royal Navy lost 28 ships while the US Navy lost 42.[3] It is true that the US Navy was successful during the opening months of the war; however, there are a number of reasons for this. First and foremost, the British were preoccupied with the war against Napoleon taking placing on the Continent. As a result, the Royal Navy’s North American squadron ships stationed at Halifax and Bermuda were relatively few in number, under-supplied, and overall not in a state of preparedness when the war began. Second, the US Navy’s frigate victories were achieved by super-frigates which far outclassed the fifth-rates which they were fighting against. To be fair, this was a smart move on the part of the US Navy, which was equipped with only a handful of warships and could not readily replace them with ships from other theaters as the Royal Navy could. Still, when pitted against multiple ships, single US warships generally did not fair too well, with a few notable exceptions such as the Constitution’s fight against the Cyane and Levant. Even Perry’s fleet took substantial damage at Lake Erie, and he had the advantage in numbers and firepower. What is more, after 1812 the Royal Navy instituted a blockade which not only kept the super-frigates in port for most of the war, it had a disastrous effect on the US economy by practically severing the export profits which were so critical to the nation.

                Despite the impossibility of victory against the Royal Navy, the US Navy performed admirably, particularly for a navy that was still new. Even though it lost more ships to the Royal Navy that it captured or destroyed, the margin was not as large as one might expect from a war between the largest fleet in the world and a small force such as the US Navy in 1812. The Navy provided some the only positive headlines for the American public during a war in which the army did not perform well. Americans became so enthusiastic about their new Navy and its “glorious” victories against the British frigates in 1812 that on January 2, 1813, President Madison signed the Naval Expansion Act, which allowed for the construction of four 74-gun battleships and six new 44-gun frigates. The act was later expanded in March to include the addition of six new sloops of war.[4] Navy commanders and captains such as Oliver Hazard Perry and Stephen Decatur were lauded as heroes by the public. And though Navy had generally not faired well against multiple Royal Navy ships, it had proved that it could match the British on even terms during the Battle of Plattsburgh. The War of 1812 then, while not a success, gave the Navy tremendous support for future development and provided it with a wealth of experience for future wars.

[1] 210-216, George C. Daughan. 1812: The Navy's War.(New York: Basic, 2011)

[2] 344-349, George C. Daughan. 1812: The Navy's War.(New York: Basic, 2011)

[3] 198, Brian Arthur. How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815. (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011)

[4] 570, William S. Dudley, Michael J. Crawford, and Christine F. Hughes. The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History. (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of Navy, 1985)

The U.S. Navy & the War of 1812 Part I

Though it was not the first conflict that the still fledgling US Navy had taken part in, the War of 1812 would be the first real test of the Navy’s mettle.

by Seth Marshall

                The War of 1812 today tends to fall into a list of wars that are commonly forgotten by both Americans and British. More recent and much larger wars from the past century remain at the forefront of many when thinking of their nations’ military history. Even at the time of the war it was only on the periphery of the British public, whose main interest was in the massive Napoleonic Wars taking place across the English Channel. Most historians appear to also have avoided the topic, with relatively few books on the topic being published. Despite this lack of interest the War of 1812 was an important period for the US Navy, which performed well against an opponent regarded as the best in the world.

                The US Navy was, much like the rest of the country, not prepared for the War of 1812.  Thanks in part to the general mistrust of standing military forces during the years following the Revolution, the American Navy was still in its infancy during the War of 1812. Following the Revolution, the Navy had effectively ceased to exist. For nine years after the decommissioning of the USS Alliance, there were no active ships serving in the US Navy. Only with the passage of the Act to Provide a Naval Armament in 1794 would there be further naval shipbuilding. This act, designed to combat Barbary pirates engaged in the capture of American merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea, allowed for the construction of the famous six frigates, United States, President, Chesapeake, Constellation, Constitution, and Congress. These vessels were designed to be capable of taking on any pirate ship they might encounter. Each displaced over 1,000 tons, had a deck length over 175 feet, carried at least thirty twenty-four pound long guns plus varying numbers of carronades.[1] These ships, which could be considered as heavy frigates (or sometimes referred to as “super-frigates”), would form the backbone of the US Navy as the War of 1812 began. At the time of the war’s outbreak, the US Navy could count on the services of another eleven ships in addition to the heavy frigates. 

                This small force of seventeen ships was all that the US Navy could field against the Royal Navy, at that time the world’s largest navy. The Royal Navy enjoyed an overall superiority in numbers, with 657 ships in service in 1811.[2] In addition, the British could draw upon their enormous victory over the French Navy at Trafalgar seven years earlier. However, the Royal Navy which faced the Americans in 1812 was not the same force which had met the French in battle at Trafalgar. Most of the British ships were engaged in blockading the French fleet in their home ports as well as supporting British army operations on the European continent. These efforts had the effect of draining supplies and ships away from the Royal Navy’s American squadron, based out of Halifax and Bermuda. British historian Jeremy Black notes that the Royal Navy’s ships at Halifax were poorly maintained and their crews had not been drilling as often as they could have.[3] Finally, the Royal Navy’s decisive victory over the French at Trafalgar had given the service somewhat of an air of invincibility- the idea that a ship of the Royal Navy, the greatest force on the seas, could be defeated by anyone else was unthinkable.

                Thanks to these problems, the US Navy was able to quickly achieve a string of victories during the months following the declaration of war on June 18, 1812. Within three days of the start of the war, multiple US warships had put to sea to search for British merchant ships to attack. The first engagement of the war occurred on June 23rd when the USS President opened fire on the HMS Belvidera, a 36-gun fifth-rate frigate. The Belvidera was hit several times but managed to escape thanks in part to a cannon misfiring and exploding on the President which killed several men.[4] Ten days later on July 3rd, the USS Essex, a fifth-rate frigate built for the US Navy by Salem, Massachusetts, became the first US warship to capture a British ship, the troopship Samuel & Sarah. July also saw the capture of the brig USS Nautilus on the 11th, the first US warship captured during the war, and also the near-capture of the USS Constitution, which just barely escaped from a British squadron after a three-day chase from Chesapeake Bay.

USS Constitution engaging and defeating the frigate HMS Guerriere on August 19, 1812.

                The fall saw several ship-to-ship battles which have for all purposes become legend for the US Navy. On August 19th, the USS Constitution defeated the HMS Guerriere, a British fifth-rate, leaving her hulk to burn and sink.[5] On October 25th, the USS United States engaged and captured the British frigate HMS Macedonian.[6] The following day, the USS Constitution again found itself fighting a British warship, this time the HMS Java, another fifth-rate frigate, and won this fight as well. These engagements provided the American public with some of the only bright spots in a war which was not proceeding well for its Army. It also caused an uproar among the British public, who were furious that the upstart Americans were defeating Royal Navy warships.[7] In addition, the events aroused the concerns of the Admiralty, who quickly realized that the American super-frigates outclassed the fifth-rate frigates in use by the Royal Navy. On July 10, 1813, the Secretary of the Admiralty issued an order to all Royal Navy frigates explicitly forbidding them from engaging the American frigates in single ship combat.[8]

                Following the first six months of the war, American ships were prevented from further successes in the Atlantic due to the increasing effectiveness of the British blockade. The North American squadron, which had not been in position in time to stop the first American warships venturing out on their commerce-raiding cruises, was able to post squadrons of warships just outside of American harbors, preventing the American super-frigates from venturing forth and keeping them bottled up for much of the war. Ships that did try to run the blockade were frequently captured- from March 30-July 22, the Royal Navy seized 138 ships, most of them American.[9] Additionally, the Royal Navy was able to defeat one of the American frigates in July, when the HMS Shannon successfully attacked the USS Chesapeake on July 10, taking her back to the Halifax.[10] The British would continue to experience success against US Navy warships, capturing or destroying 20 by December 1813.[11] As the war progressed, the British blockade took its toll on the American economy, dropping export profits from $45M in 1811 to just $7M in 1814.[12] By the time the war had ended in 1815, the Royal Navy’s blockade had seized or destroyed some 1,400 American vessels, a substantial portion of the merchant fleet. Most American warships which were not captured by the blockade spent most of 1813 and 1814 stuck in port. The chances of escape were slim enough that several warships were laid up in ordinary as a cost-saving measure. Only on rare occasions did US warships attempt to run the blockade. In January 1815 the USS President attempted to break out into the Atlantic for commerce raiding, only to be surrounded and defeated by a British squadron just off the East Coast. The following month, the USS Constitution engaged and captured the HMS Cyane and briefly the HMS Levant after having successfully run the blockade in December 1814. American privateers experienced a trend similar to the US warships, with a multitude of success during the first six months of the war followed by two years of sparser activity. Privateers did manage to account for some 1,600 ships over the course of the war, but as British historian Brian Arthur points out, that figure represented only 7.5% of the all British merchant shipping, and the overall size of the merchant fleet increased by 4.5% during the war, greatly lessening the effect of American commerce raiding.[13]

HMS Shannon escorts the captured USS Chesapeake into Halifax in June 1813.

                American warships on the Eastern coast then, while achieving several high profile victories, were forced to reside in port for much of the war thanks to the very effective British blockade. Those losses that the US Navy and American privateers were able to inflict on the British were not so damaging that they endangered the British capability to wage war on the seas. The British blockade, on the other hand, caused critical economic damage to the US, calling into question not only it’s ability to fight but also its ability to simply continue functioning as a country. In the Part 2 of this article, I will discuss the battles on the Lakes and the War of 1812’s effect on the US Navy.

[1] Ian W. Toll Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy ( New York: W.W. Norton &, 2006)

[2] 30, Brian Arthur. How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815. (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011)

[3] 1, Jeremy Black. "A British View of the War of 1812." United States Naval Institute. Web. 25 Apr. 2013. (http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2008-08/british-view-naval-war-1812)

[4] Xxviii, George C. Daughan. 1812: The Navy's War.(New York: Basic, 2011)

[5] 76-77, George C. Daughan. 1812: The Navy's War.(New York: Basic, 2011)

[6] 133, George C. Daughan. 1812: The Navy's War.(New York: Basic, 2011)

[7] 134, Ronald D. Utt. Ships of Oak, Guns of Iron: The War of 1812 and the Forging of the American Navy. (Washington, DC: Regnery History, 2012)

[8] 134, Ronald D. Utt. Ships of Oak, Guns of Iron: The War of 1812 and the Forging of the American Navy. (Washington, DC: Regnery History, 2012)

[9] 95, Brian Arthur. How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815. (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011)

[10] 191-194, George C. Daughan. 1812: The Navy's War.(New York: Basic, 2011)

[11] 103, Brian Arthur. How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815. (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011)

[12] 1, “A British View of the War of 1812”

[13] 199, Brian Arthur. How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815. (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011)

Ok, so it's a little late, but this is definitely a topic worth remembering. November 30th marked the 75th anniversary of the start of the Winter War, the first of two conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Often forgotten today due to World War II occurring at the same time, the Winter War lasted for 105 days during a brutally cold winter. 

War between the two countries had been brewing for a number of years prior, mainly due to the Soviet Union's insistence that the Finns yield the Karelian Isthmus, among other territorial possessions. The Karelian Isthmus, north of St. Petersburg (Leningrad), had been a point of contention between the two countries for centuries, and was considered by the Soviets to be particularly strategic for its location in relation to Leningrad. After years of demanding territory to no avail, the Soviets took matters into their own hands. In late November 1939, the Soviets claimed that the Finns had launched artillery strikes on their territory. Investigation has since revealed that the artillery strikers had in fact come from the Soviets, not the Finns. Nonetheless, the Soviets attacked a few days later on November 30, launching air raids on Helsinki and beginning a massive ground offensive against the Finns. However, despite having an overwhelming numerical advantage in both men and machines, the Soviets met very stiff resistance from the Finns.

The Finns were commanded by Field Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim, an officer who ironically had spent much of his military career in service with the Russians. During the Finnish Civil War in 1918, Mannerheim had commanded the Whites and defeated the communist forces, gaining a reputation as a capable though cold and calculating leader. Mannerheim had no illusions regarding the threat posed by the Soviets. At the time of the Winter War, Finland's population stood at 4 million, a figure which had no hope of supporting a long-term war against the Soviets with the massive manpower base. Mannerheim therefore positioned his forces in a way to maximize their potential. Mannerheim assumed that he Soviets would not attack through the desolate northern wilderness, but would instead attack through the Karelian Isthmus. He placed six divisions under the Army of the Karelian Isthmus to repel attacks through this corridor, two divisions under control of the Fourth Corps to protect the northern shores of Lake Ladoga, and the North Finland Group, which was responsible for covering the remaining 625-mile border between Finland and the Soviet Union.[1] Mannerheim wisely assumed that the Soviets would attack through the Karelian Isthmus rather than try to attack through the thick arctic forests of the northern border, and concentrated his forces along the Mannerheim line, a series of fortifications that, while somewhat crude by comparison with other fortifications, were intended to repulse a Soviet attack.

                On the other hand, the Soviets had concentrated a huge amount of manpower for their attack. The 7th Army, containing between 12-14 divisions, three tank brigades, and a mechanized corps attacked up the Karelian Isthmus. The 8th Army, consisting of six rifle divisions and two tank brigades, would attack to the north of Lake Ladoga. The 9th Army, which included five rifle divisions with attached armor, would support the offensive in the north. Finally, the 14th Army, with three “mediocre” divisions with some armor support, would attack from Murmansk towards the north of Finland.[2] Aside from a huge advantage in armor (the Finns had virtually no tanks themselves), Soviets could also turn to their air force, which vastly outnumbered anything the Finns could through against them.

FINNISH SKI TROOPS TAKE COVER IN NORTHERN FINLAND, JANUARY 1940.

                Despite these figures, the Finns were able to put up an incredibly stout resistance. For over two months, the Soviets suffered at both the hands of the Finns, who were more than familiar with the heavily forested terrain, and the freezing winter conditions, for which the Soviets were unprepared. Despite their near complete lack of armor, the Finns found ways of disabling Soviet tanks, ranging from strategically placing their few Bofors anti-aircraft guns in places where the Soviets concentrated their armor, to firebombs. In fact, during the entire war, the Soviets lost over 1900 tanks to combat and 1200 tanks to mechanical difficulties in the Karelian Isthmus alone.[3] The Soviets were also unprepared for the Finnish Air Force, which though thoroughly outnumbered by the Red Air Force and equipped only with second-rate foreign types, managed to shoot down roughly 240 aircraft over the course of the war while losing only 26[4]. As the Finns fought back, Soviet troop morale plummeted. Unfortunately for the Finns, despite inflicting grievous losses on the Soviets, they were fighting a losing war. Their small pre-war army and manpower base was unable to support the war of attrition being fought in the wilderness. In fact, Finland’s strategy for winning the war depended upon foreign assistance. The Finnish government attempted to persuade several Western governments to assist them in fighting the Soviets, most notably with France and Great Britain. Both countries eventually agreed to a plan that would commit over 100,000 troops to landings in Sweden with an advance into Finland to support the Finns in non-combat roles. However, the war ended before these plans could be affected.  

MUCH OF THE SOVIET ARMOR WAS MADE UP OF LIGHT TANKS, SUCH AS THIS T-26, WHICH WERE VULNERABLE TO LIGHT ANTI-TANK GUNS AND SATCHEL CHARGES USED BY THE FINNS.

By February 1940, the Soviets finally began to learn from their mistakes. Chipping away at Finnish forces through artillery barrages and small infantry assaults, the Soviets broke through the Mannerheim line in mid-February. By early March, the Soviets were advancing deeper into Finland. Resigned to their fate, the Finns proposed a surrender effective March 5, but the Soviets declined, preferring to capitalize on their gains. Finally, on March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow. A cease-fire went into effect the following day. The Finns suffered some 24,823 killed and 43,557 wounded, with another 420,000 rendered homeless by the peace treaty, which had seded the Karelian Isthmus and other former Finnish territories to the Soviets.[5] Losses for the Soviets continues to be debated by historians. Official Soviet claims at the time of the treaty listed 48,745 killed and over 159,000 wounded. However, more modern estimates by Russian historians have found that Soviet losses were probably closer to 230,000 killed either from combat or as a result of disease or exposure and another 200,000-300,000 wounded.[6] Included in this figure is some 5,000+ Soviet prisoners released by the Finns back to the Soviets at the conclusion of the war. Many of these prisoners were simply executed by the Soviets for their perceived failure or sent to prison camps. In any case, most of the repatriated prisoners did not survive for long.

The Winter War was not the only conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union. Just over a year after the end of the Winter War, the Finns sided with the Germans during their invasion of the Soviet Union, eager to regain their lost territory. The Continuation War would drag on until 1944, when the Finns signed another treaty with the Soviets. Shortly afterwards, the Finns sided with the Soviets and began the Lapland War, an offensive which pushed their former German allies out of Finland. The war finally concluded with a German surrender on April 25, 1945. Despite Finland’s later allying with Germany, the Winter War continues to be remembered as a classic example of a small country bravely resisting a much later and better equipped country, though in the end the Soviets were ultimately successful in their efforts.

[1] P.47 Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin of Chapel Hill, 1991. Print.

[2] P. 38-39 Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin of Chapel Hill, 1991. Print.

[3] http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINatTactics.htm#losses 12/30/2014

[4] P.187-193 Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin of Chapel Hill, 1991. Print

[5] P.263 Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin of Chapel Hill, 1991. Print

[6] Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin of Chapel Hill, 1991. Print