Submarines in the Pacific War Part II

In the previous part, I discussed submarine design of both the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. In this conclusion, I will discuss how the US Navy succeeded in its campaign against the Japanese merchant fleet, and why the Japanese struggled to find success with their submarines.

One of the most important factors in the US Navy’s success was the renouncement of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which forbade navies from implementing unrestricted submarine warfare against their opponents. While outwardly US Navy doctrine had held the submarine in a scouting role to the main surface fleet, submariners had always been loath this concept. As war approached, submariners made reports and published doctrine which took their boats away from the surface fleet and target enemy shipping and warships while operating independently.[1] This doctrine would be affirmed mere hours after Pearl Harbor when Admiral Harold Stark ordered all US submarines to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. While it violated the terms of the London Naval Treaty and caused the deaths of thousands of Japanese sailors (as well as Allied POWs aboard some Japanese ships), the change in doctrine had a devastating affect upon Japan’s ability to resupply its Pacific outposts, to such an extent that it turned to its own submarines to fill the gap left by sunk transports.

                While the US Navy promptly changed its stance on the role of its submarines in battle, the IJN did not. The IJN preferred to adhere to its General Battle Instructions from 1934, which read “Submarines are deployed effectively for the purpose of achieving their main goal: surprise attack on the enemy’s main force.” As the war progressed, submarine duties were clarified in the Combined Fleet’s Tactical Instructions of 1943, which detailed the specific roles of submarines. “Submarines, aided by naval aircraft, reconnoiter enemy bases or anchorages. If the enemy sorties, submarines and aircraft attempt to intercept the enemy fleet and maintain contact.”[2] The later set of instructions is remarkable given its release date- by this point in the war, the Japanese would be all too well aware of the effects of American submarines on their shipping. IJN submarines experienced some success using their battle doctrine during 1942, when they sank a number of Allied warships (including the memorable attack by the I-168, which sank both the carrier USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS Hammann). However, their successes fell off dramatically as the Allies became more adept at detecting and sinking submarines and as IJN submarines were increasingly shifted to other missions. Early in the war, submarines were frequently used as platforms to launch aircraft on reconnaissance flights over US territory. On one occasion, a floatplane was launched from a submarine carrying incendiary bombs with the purpose of starting forest fires in Oregon. Submarines also used their deck guns to shell various industrial facilities along the West Coast and military structures on Midway Island on several occasions, with little to no results. Later in the war, submarines would again become launch platforms for attacks on US installations, this time through the use of midget submarines and Kaitens (one-man kamikaze submarines). These attacks also had little effect on the Allies, and were ultimately did more harm than good to the IJN as the slow carrier submarines were frequently detected and destroyed before launching their kaitens. The severe effects of the US submarine campaign on Japanese shipping forced the IJN to find alternative means of getting supplies to the front lines and garrison islands scattered throughout the Pacific. Consequently, submarines were frequently relegated to carrying supplies and troops rather than being used to hunt for Allied ships.

                The shift in doctrine on the part of the US Navy paid off, as evidenced by postwar analysis conducted by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, which was created to examine IJN and Japanese maritime fleet losses. Initially, Vice Admiral Charles Lockwood, commander of the US submarines in the Pacific, estimated that the vessels under his command had sunk roughly 4,000 ships for 10 million tons. Analysis by JANAC reduced this figure to 1,314 ships sunk for 5.3 million tons. Despite this greatly reduced figure, the American submarines were responsible for the sinking of an astounding 55% of all Japanese vessels lost during the war. [3] This figure included the loss of 1,113 merchant ships for 4.9 million tons of merchant shipping (60% of all Japanese merchant ships sunk) and 201 warships for 540,000 tons. Among the warships sunk were eight aircraft carriers of varying types, one battleship, and eleven light and heavy cruisers. The JANAC group also credited submarines as “probably” having sunk an additional 78 ships for 263,306 tons. By comparison, the carrier aircraft of the US Navy sank 2 million tons of shipping, roughly half of which was IJN vessels.[4]The losses inflicted by submarines were devastating to the Japanese merchant fleet, which could not replace its losses in men and material nearly quick enough. The statistics for the submarine force are even more remarkable when one considers the size of the US submarine fleet in relation to the rest of the Navy. The entire branch was staffed with 50,000 officers and men, representing only 1.6% of all naval personnel.[5] In return for their achievements, the American submarine force lost fifty-two submarines to all causes over the course of the war, resulting in the loss of 3500 officers and men. This gave the submarine force the highest casualty rate in the entire U.S. military, with 22% of men serving on war patrols being killed in action.[6] These figures are indicative of the remarkable performance given by the US submarine force during the Pacific War.

                IJN submarines were substantially less successful during the war. This is in large part due to the Combined Fleet’s doctrine of using submarines as scouting units rather than merchant raiders. Over the course of the war, IJN submarines sank 184 merchant vessels for 907,000 tons.[7] They were also able to sink a number of warships, including two fleet carriers, a cruiser, and several destroyers in 1942 alone. However, Japanese successes decreased as the war went on and they were increasingly relegated to supply missions and other roles which took them away from Allied shipping lanes. They were also seriously hindered by catastrophic losses. The IJN began the war with 63 submarines and completed another 111 before the surrender. Of these 174 submarines, 128 were sunk during wartime. Many of those which did survive the war were training ships or had only just finished construction, meaning that very few of Japan’s fleet submarines were operational at the end of the war.[8]

                Considering how deadly that the U.S. submarines proved to be to the IJN surface fleet and the Japanese merchant fleet in particular, it is surprising that this aspect of the Pacific War has received such little attention over the years. Despite encountering problems with its submarines, captains, and especially its torpedoes, the US Navy’s submarines were extremely effective in limiting the number of supplies which made it Japanese garrisons across the Pacific. Conversely, the IJN, despite having a very capable submarine fleet at the start of the war, had relatively little to show for its efforts at the time of the surrender. The most crucial element of the US success and IJN disappointment was the US Navy’s willingness to change its strategy with regard to its submarines, turning them loose on Japanese shipping lanes to make them as effective as possible. This, coupled with the US’ ability to quickly produce fleet submarines and well-trained crews to man them made the US submarine force large and effective force which wreaked havoc on Japanese supply lines and hindered their ability to fight.

[1] 153, Joel Ira Holwitt, Execute against Japan: Freedom-of-the-seas, the U.S Navy, fleet submarines, and the U.S. decision to conduct unrestricted warfare, 1919-1941, 2005.

[2] 191-193, Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida. The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995)

[3] 851-852, Clay Blair Jr. Silent Victory (Philadelphia & New York, PA & NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975)

[4] “Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes”http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-1.html 10/3/13

[5] 853, Clay Blair Jr. Silent Victory (Philadelphia & New York, PA & NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975)

[6] 851, Clay Blair Jr. Silent Victory (Philadelphia & New York, PA & NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975)

[7] “Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy” http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm 10/3/2013

[8] “Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy” http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm 10/3/2013

Submarines in the Pacific War Part I

World War II saw the widest use of submarines in combat in any conflict since the vessel was first invented. While the campaign against the German U-boats in the Atlantic is a familiar subject, much less well known is the topic of submarine warfare in the Pacific. This is surprising, given the impact which the US Navy’s submarines had upon the supply of Japanese island bases on Pacific islands, as well as the ineffectiveness of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) submarine force. As the war progressed, US submarines greatly increased in numbers and effectiveness, going out on six-week long war patrols to stalk Japanese shipping lanes. By contrast, the IJN’s submarine force was whittled down due to accidents and sinkings, with the survivors being squandered on resupply missions and pointless special operations. The results of this campaign are even more surprising when one considers that the IJN perhaps one of the best submarine forces in the world prior to the start of the war.

                By the time that the Second World War began, submarines had already seen combat in the American Civil War and First World War. The use of U-boats during the First World War had a particularly heavy impact on navies around the world who sought to wield a submarine force of their own as successfully as the Germans had. The period between the wars became a period of growth for the US Navy and the IJN, both of whom set about designing types of submarines specifically suited for their own battle doctrine.   

                The eminent submarine design of the US Navy during the interwar period was the fleet boat, a type of submarine which was created a few years prior to the US entry into World War II. Fleet boat submarines were designed to be the scouts of the US Navy, ranging ahead of the surface fleet to report on enemy ship movements and attack targets to cause as much damage to fleets as possible. To fulfill their scouting mission, fleet boats were designed to travel quickly while on the surface, be able to stay at sea for long periods of time, dive deeper, and carry more weaponry. The Gato-class submarine design would make up the backbone of the US Navy’s submarine force during the Pacific War and shared the traits which characterized the typical fleet boat. Gato submarines were 312 feet long and displaced 1,800 tons when surfaced. They had a range of 20,000 miles and an endurance of about 75 days. Each Gato, crewed by 80+ officers and men, was armed with a medium-caliber deck gun for use against unarmed merchant vessels, 3-4 anti-aircraft guns, and ten torpedo tubes (with 24 torpedoes on board).[1] The Gato-class and the subsequent Balao-class submarines were the two most numerous types of US submarine used in the Pacific War and would be responsible for inflicting huge losses on Japanese merchant fleets.

 The USS Silversides (SS-236), a Balao-lass fleet submarine, during the fall of 1944.              

Unlike the US Navy, the IJN designed numerous types of submarines varying in size and in purpose. The IJN built submarines including: midget submarines, manned torpedoes, medium-range submarines, supply submarines (purpose-built), fleet submarines (many of which were built to carry aircraft in water-tight hangars), and submarines designed for high-speed underwater. The IJN built these many types of submarines to fit with their battle doctrine, which was structured around the concept of the decisive battle. In this scenario, IJN submarines were to be the scouts of the Navy, reporting on enemy warships and attacking when they could. To fulfill this role as well as other mission requirements, Japan constructed the most diverse submarine fleet of any navy.  The IJN possessed the largest submarines built prior to the nuclear-powered submarines that became a staple of the Cold War. This was the I-400- class, three of which were in service at the end of the war. These submarines were 400 feet long, displaced over 5,000 tons while surfaced, and could carry three aircraft in their hangars.[2] However, the I-400-class was exceptional- a more typical class of Japanese submarine was the Type B1. The Type B1 was the most numerous IJN submarine, with twenty constructed during the Second World War. These submarines were 356 feet long, displaced 2,854 tons, had a range of 14,000 miles, were crewed by 94 officers and men, and held one seaplane in a forward hangar.[3]

              The I-401, one of the four I-400-class submarines built by the IJN near the end of the war, flying the US flag after being captured by the US Navy.

          In addition to submarine design, both the US Navy and the IJN made certain that the crews who manned their submarines were extremely capable. The US Navy subjected both officer and enlisted candidates to rigorous physical, mental, and aptitude tests. After going through a sixteen-week long trade school, candidates were subjected to further physical tests for admittance into submarine school. If a recruit made it into submarine school, he was required to learn every aspect of submarine life and duties. After several weeks of class-work, recruits were sent to sea aboard practice submarines to experience their first dives as well as operate the sub. Following graduation, newly-minted submariners were assigned to their first submarine and frequently required to become certified, a process which generally occurred during their first war patrol.[4] While US submariners were put through a strenuous training process and often experienced difficult conditions while at sea, the US Navy compensated them for their duties by supplementing their base pay with wartime bonuses, providing them with fresh food at the start of war patrols, shore leave during periods between war patrols, and rotation stateside to be reassigned to new submarines.

                The IJN, similarly to the US Navy, was highly selective of the men who crewed its submarines. Cadet officers were sent to the Etajima Naval Academy, where they had to endure 17-hour work days, six and half days a week with only two relatively short seasonal breaks during the year. Officer recruits were also expected to maintain strict discipline at all times as well as go through intensive physical training.[5] Unlike US submariners, IJN recruits were required to reach the rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade before applying to submarine school. Officers would then go through six months of submarine school and four months of additional training before being assigned to a training submarine. If the officer survived this grueling process, then he was assigned to an active boat. Enlisted men went through a similar rigorous routine of drill and classwork before being assigned to a vessel, passing through service schools and submarine school. After six months at submarine school, enlisted men were sent to the first vessel.[6] Once a Japanese sailor was a qualified submariner, he received surprisingly good treatment during his service at sea. IJN submariners received additional pay, though not as much as their American counterparts. Japanese submarines were well-stocked with provisions for good meals and snacks, just as US submarines. Japanese submariners even had access to some recreational facilities when off the submarine, though they were not nearly as extravagant as what was available to the Americans, as one I-boat captain related after the war: “I learned after the war that the American Navy leased the plush Royal Hawaiian Hotel at Wakiki Beach for its submariners, allowing them to have a full and relaxed rest between war patrols. Japanese submariners enjoyed nothing like that kind of comfort.”[7]

                Given the intensive training and the relatively good treatment of crews and the amount of effort dedicated to submarine design and construction by both navies, it might strike some as odd that the US Navy’s submarines met with such huge successes, while the Japanese experienced few victories. There are a number of reasons for the US Navy’s success, one of the largest of which is the simple fact that the US Navy quickly changed its policy regarding how submarines would function during the war. These changes will be discussed in Part 2.

[1] Gato-class specifications (www.fleetsubmarine.com, 2002, 8/28/2013)

[2] http://www.combinedfleet.com/ships/i-400 8/29/2013

[3] http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_b1.htm 8/29/2013

[4] 11-14, Robert Hargis. US Submarine Crewman: 1941-1945. Oxford (u.a.: Osprey, 2003)

[5] 105-106, Zenji Orita and Joseph Daniel Harrington. I-boat Captain (Canoga Park, CA: Major, 1976)

[6] 198, Zenji Orita and Joseph Daniel Harrington. I-boat Captain (Canoga Park, CA: Major, 1976)

[7] 165, Zenji Orita and Joseph Daniel Harrington. I-boat Captain (Canoga Park, CA: Major, 1976)

Military Ballooning in the American Civil War Part II

During the American Civil War, both the Union and the Confederacy used balloons for observation and reconnaissance, foreshadowing the usage of aircraft in World War I 50 years later.

By Seth Marshall

                In the previous entry, I wrote about the beginnings of the Union Balloon Corps and some of its early operational uses. In this portion, I will expand on the operations undertaken by the Union, the Confederacy’s attempts to start their own balloon unit, and the eventual end of the Balloon Corps.

                                                       LOWE'S BALLOON INTREPID 

                The balloon that Lowe observed was taken manned by Captain John Randolph Bryan. Bryan’s balloon was not as well-constructed as its Union counterparts, and was a hot-air balloon inflated by burning pine knots in turpentine. First flown on April 13th, 1862, Bryan’s balloon adventures were short-lived, as Lowe did not observe it making flights for more than a few weeks. This attempt was somewhat representative of Confederate efforts to create a dedicated balloon unit of their own; their efforts seem to have been not as focused as was the case with the Union. The Confederates created another balloon known commonly as the “Silk Dress Balloon” (it was believed to have been made of silk dresses, but was not), but was officially named the Gazelle. The balloon, which was not as big as even the smallest Union balloon, was piloted by Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who used a number of black balls below the gondola to signal ground forces. Unfortunately, due to the patchwork nature of the balloon, it was subject to frequent leaks and did not stay airborne for long. The Confederates, as their Union counterparts, also used a balloon tender, the Teaser, to service the Gazelle. However, in mid-1862, the Teaser was discovered while servicing the Gazelle by the Union gunboat Maratanza. Both small ships opened fire upon each other with cannon, but only the Maratanza scored hits. With their barge damaged, the Confederates attempted to scuttle the ship and the balloon with it, but failed. In the end, the Union vessel captured the entire Confederate balloon operation- balloon, equipment, and barge. The capture of the Gazelle along with its support equipment effectively ended Confederate attempts with balloons.[1]

                Meanwhile, Lowe and his men continued to make observations of Confederate troops. Lowe and his balloons were present at many of the battles of the Peninsular Campaign. At the battle of Fair Oaks, Lowe observed Confederate troops moving to attack Union positions in such a way that they had not been discovered by Union ground forces. Lowe passed his information on to McClellan, who sent reinforcements in order to counter the Confederate movement.[2]

                Perhaps more valuable than the intelligence provided by the balloonists was the effect that seeing a Union balloon had upon Confederate troops. The Confederates, knowing perfectly well that the balloons’ purpose was to report on their positions, would frequently shoot at the balloons, though virtually none of the shots fired actually hit. In fact, Union troops frequently complained when balloons deployed in their area because the Confederate rounds would miss and land among their units instead. The balloonists would be ordered to move from their position several times because of this. Other observers noted the effects that balloons had upon the Rebel troops. “One correspondent wrote that the appearance of Lowe’s balloon sent the Confederate artillerists into “paroxysms of rage.” Failing to hit it with rifle and shell fire, the thwarted rebels often “cried of it with derision.””[3] The truth was that the Confederates feared the balloons far more than the Union valued them. General Beauregard ordered the men under his command to douse their lights at night and to use the cover of woods to prevent being spotted from air.[4] The Confederates also took to using what became known as “Quaker guns”- logs disguised as cannons to fool Union balloonists into thinking that Rebel fortified areas were stronger than they actually were.[5] This apparently was effective, since McClellan once used this in his reasoning to delay an attack, later resulting in scandal when the “guns” were discovered by Union infantry. Later, after the Balloon Corps had ceased operations, the Confederates questioned the balloons’ disappearance. Following the war, one former rebel officer wrote,

“I have never understood why the enemy abandoned the use of military balloons in early 1863, after using them extensively up to that time,” said Alexander. “Even if the observers never saw anything they world have been worth all they cost for the annoyance and delays they caused us in trying to keep our movements out of their right.”[6]

                Whatever success the Balloon Corps had, it was operating on borrowed time. During its entire lifespan, the Corps was riddled with internal dissent. Lowe and La Mountain were not fond of each other thanks to a rivalry which had carried over from peacetime. The relationship deteriorated to a point where both were trying to destroy the others reputations. The Corps also nearly ceased to exist when Lowe came down with a serious case of malaria during the summer of 1862. Following his recovery, he returned to his duties only to discover his wagons and other equipment and been requisitioned by a quartermaster. After operating at the Battle of Chancellorsville the following year, Lowe was ousted as the commander of the unit, thanks mostly due to a man named Freno who had formerly been a part of the unit but was expelled for his habits of drinking and gambling. Lowe, who had never received pay for his troubles during the two years of operation, tried to submit his resignation, but was denied. He finally left the service in 1864.

THADDEUS LOWE CA. 1865

                The Balloon Corps might not necessarily have had the most substantial impact upon the outcome of the war, but it was a very significant part of the concept of the Civil War as a truly modern war. The ways in which balloons were used in the Civil War foreshadowed the ways in which aircraft would be used not just in World Wars I and II, but in Korea, Vietnam, and modern conflicts today. In this sense, balloons were an important innovation used during the Civil War. Their usage as a means of reconnaissance and artillery spotting are both missions that continue to be used in some form or another in today’s Air Force.

            Resources

1.       Poleskie, Steve. The Balloonist: the Story of T.S.C. Lowe-- Inventor, Scientist, Magician, and Father of the U.S. Air Force. Savannah, GA: Frederic C. Beil, 2007. Print.

2.       Evans, Charles M,. War of the Aeronauts: the History of Ballooning in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002. Print.

3.       Phillips, Gervase. "Was the American Civil War the First Modern War?" History Review 2006. Web. 22 Nov. 2011.

4.       "Æ Aeragon - First Modern War." Æ Aeragon - Military Technology Transfer. Web. 08 Dec. 2011. <http://www.aeragon.com/03/>.

5.       www.civilwarhome.com 9/15/11

[1] P. 245 Evans, Charles M,. War of the Aeronauts: the History of Ballooning in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002. Print

[2] Poleskie, Steve. The Balloonist: the Story of T.S.C. Lowe-- Inventor, Scientist, Magician, and Father of the U.S. Air Force. Savannah, GA: Frederic C. Beil, 2007. Print.

[3] P. 197 Poleskie, Steve. The Balloonist: the Story of T.S.C. Lowe-- Inventor, Scientist, Magician, and Father of the U.S. Air Force. Savannah, GA: Frederic C. Beil, 2007. Print.

[4] P. 113 Evans, Charles M,. War of the Aeronauts: the History of Ballooning in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002. Print

[5] Evans, Charles M,. War of the Aeronauts: the History of Ballooning in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002. Print

[6] P. 295 Evans, Charles M,. War of the Aeronauts: the History of Ballooning in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002. Print

Fury Review

The movie has been out for about a month now, but it's definitely worth a review (so be warned, SPOILERS AHEAD). For those that haven't heard, Fury is a film starring Brad Pitt, Shia LeBeouf, Jon Bernthal, Michael Pena and Logan Lerman. It centers around a new recruit (Lerman) who is conscripted into the crew of Fury, a late model Sherman tank commanded by SSgt "Wardaddy" Collier, in the closing weeks of World War II in Europe. I was somewhat apprehensive going into this film, afraid that it might be another cheap war movie- perhaps even as bad as "Red Tails", a movie for which I am still cursing the name of George Lucas. I was pleasantly surprised to find that "Fury" turned out to be a well-performed, gritty, and accurate war film. 

First off, there is the tanks. Fury is not the first movie to have had Shermans in it, but I can't recall ever seeing a movie with such a diverse group of Shermans. In Fury's platoon alone there were three different variants, from early model cast-hull with a short-barreled 75mm gun to Fury itself, an M4A3E8, the last production Sherman. Then, of course, there is the Tiger. For the first time since the end of the war, a real Tiger I, tank number 131 from the Bovington Tank Museum, was used in a film. It doesn't get too much time on screen, but the segment where it appears is alone worth seeing the movie. 

The M4A3E8 Sherman used as "Fury" in the film, owned by the Bovington Tank Museum 

Tiger 131, the only operational Tiger tank in the world, was used in the film. It is also owned by the Bovington Museum.

In addition to the very real tanks in the movie, the film's story tries to be as accurate a portrayal of the horrors of life as a tanker in the war as possible.  Much of the film is spent in the confines of Fury, where the audience can gain a sense of the dirty, cramped and dangerous space on the inside of a tank. We also see the actors performing as a close-knit tank crew, which is not altogether surprising considering that the five main cast went through a rigorous boot camp prior to the film which, among other things, forced them to live inside the tank. The actions that the characters take are not unbelievable either. "Wardaddy" was apparently modeled off of SSgt. Lafayette G. Pool, an American tanker who destroyed over 250 vehicles and 12 tanks before he was wounded in late 1944. The last stand of the tank crew is also reminiscent of Lt. Audie Murphy's lone stand against a German tank attack supported by infantry outside of Holtzwihr in January 1945.

Overall, I was impressed with the movie. Its a fresh look at the horrors of war as experienced by a tank crew during the closing days of the war. The story is well-written, the actors do an excellent job of portraying a veteran group of tankers, and the tanks are very authentic. I would definitely recommend this movie to anyone interested in World War II history.

Military Ballooning in the American Civil War

During the American Civil War, both the Union and the Confederacy used balloons for observation and reconnaissance, foreshadowing the usage of aircraft in World War I 50 years later.

By Seth Marshall

The American Civil War is frequently viewed as one of the first modern wars. This idea is not necessarily true, since many of the technological innovations that are often thought of having first been used in the Civil War were actually used in earlier conflicts. One example of such technology is the balloon, which was used by the French decades before the Civil War. However, the Civil War was the first time that the balloon was deployed in a formally organized unit. Though this unit was relatively small and it ultimately did not have an enormous impact on the war, it marked a milestone in the history of military aviation.

The first balloon took flight in France in the late 1700s, and was used by the French military as early as the 1790s. Balloons were used by the French in several battles during their Revolutionary Wars, but they were only used individually, and their unit, the French Aerostatic Corps, was not as well organized as the Balloon Corps would emerge in the Civil War. The idea of the balloon as a military asset was primarily a Northern effort, though the South occasionally experimented with literally patchwork balloons. Prior to the Civil War, a number of inventors, scientists, and adventure-seekers were experimenting with balloons in the U.S. One of the more successful of these men was Thaddeus C. Lowe. Lowe had made numerous balloon flights prior to the war, including one attempt to fly across the Atlantic (he did not even come close to achieving his goal, coming down after only a few hours after ascending and never having reached the coast).  While balloons were frequently viewed as a curiosity more than as a practical means of war or transportation before the war, the Civil War allowed for new possibilities. The War Department became interested in the idea of acquiring balloons for military purposes. Lowe was soon involved in discussions with the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, as well as President Lincoln, who both were intrigued by the idea of a flying unit. In June of 1861, Lowe made several demonstration flights on the lawn of the Smithsonian, proving his capabilities. One of these experimental flights involved the use of a telegraph wire connected to ground, which Lowe used to send a message to the President. This would be the very first air-to-ground electronic transmission of any kind.

                In a continuation of his experiments, Lowe was sent to the front lines with his balloon in order to test the idea of using his aircraft as a means of artillery observation. Lowe ascended to several hundred feet, taking with him a set of field classes and a white flag with which to signal men on the ground. When the rounds fell off their mark, Lowe waved the flag to indicate the artillerymen should adjust their fire. A few attempts, Lowe observed the rounds landing among Confederate positions. The Confederates, realizing that the balloon was the source of their troubles, began shooting the balloon even though it was several miles distant. Lowe quickly ordered the balloon pulled down.

                After his initial successful ascents, Lowe received funding and orders to form the first “Balloon Corps.” While officially titled the Aeronautical Corps, newspapers referred to the curious new unit as the Balloon Corps. [1]The Corps was formed around Lowe’s balloon, The Union, with the addition of four new balloons: Intrepid, Constitution, United States, and Washington. However, Lowe was not assigned a large number of men for his new unit; he began to recruit other balloonists to give his corps an experienced group of personnel. Other balloonists included John Wise, James Allen, and John La Mountain. These men, along with Lowe, were some of the leading balloonists of the time and brought their extensive experience to the Balloon Corps. However, despite being employed by the Union Army, none of the balloonists involved ever received commissions in the army, though they did apply for them numerous times. Lowe, as the commander of the unit, would take to wearing a Union officer’s overcoat sans rank insignia to denote his status as the unit’s leader.

                Under Lowe’s direction, the Corps devised a few inventions to aid them in their deployment of balloons in the field. Because the balloons were to be filled with gas instead of hot air, a means of inflating the balloons had to be devised. Lowe himself designed a portable hydrogen cart that filled the balloons with gas in the field. The other balloonists would also contribute their own ideas to the running of the unit. James Allen was perhaps one of the first people to consider arming aircraft when he suggested placing percussion grenades in case Confederate troops surrounded the balloon while it was in the air, with the hope that the shrapnel from the grenades would sever the tether lines.

                By March of 1862, the Balloon Corps was outfitted with seven “war balloons” of varying sizes, six gas generators, and eight balloonists. Additionally, the Navy departed modified a barge, the George Washington Parke Custis, to be used as a “balloon carrier” by making the structure above the waterline a level deck with only tie-downs. This could perhaps be considered the world’s very first aircraft carrier.[2] In addition, the Balloon Corps had been making many ascents during the winter months, training for operations on campaign. This was well-timed, since General George McClellan was finally ready to begin his offensive, with Lowe and his Corps providing observations on enemy positions and troop movements.  Though the Corps had been making observation flights against Confederate positions prior to the offensive, the Peninsular Campaign would mark a major upturn in the use of balloons.

                As the campaign very slowly moved along the Peninsula, requests for observations against Confederate positions began to increase. Being able to view Confederate positions from several hundred feet, with a grand view of the landscape not blocked by tall-standing trees or hills proved to be very useful. Balloonists would ascend for flights that ranged from ten minutes to an hour, making notes and sketches of what they saw in notepads, then descend and report their findings to army commanders. Balloon flights were generally took the entire day, since it took time to move the balloons into position (the balloonists had to be careful to not tear the balloons on tree branches or other obstacles) and inflate them.

                While the majority of ascents went as planned, problems did arise on several flights. On one occasion, the balloon The Union was blown away by gale force winds, though it was later recovered with only minor damage. On another occasion, General Andrew Porter was taking a ride in one of the balloons alone when the tether line broke. The balloon drifted over Confederate lines, whose troops immediately began shooting at the free-flying balloon. Meanwhile,  Porter took notes on Confederate positions. Eventually, the balloon drifted back over Union lines and landed. Perhaps most interesting was one incident during which Lowe was airborne during the battle at Yorktown. After a short time making his usual observations, Lowe was surprised to see another balloon rise over the Confederate positions. Lowe noted that this balloon was multi-colored and was airborne for some time. This was the first time that aircraft from opposing sides of a war were present over a battlefield.

                Lowe had observed a Confederate balloon, indicating that the South was also interested in the possibilities that balloons offered. However, it would be the better organized and more well-supplied Union Balloon Corps that experienced more success during the Civil War. Despite this, even the Northern unit was destined to be a relatively short-lived experiment. In part two of this article, I will discuss the Confederacy’s venture in aeronautics and the end of the Union Balloon Corps.

[1] P. 89 A History of Ballooning in the Civil War

[2] P. 174 Poleskie, Steve. The Balloonist: the Story of T.S.C. Lowe-- Inventor, Scientist, Magician, and Father of the U.S. Air Force. Savannah, GA: Frederic C. Beil, 2007. Print.

[3] P. 160 Poleskie, Steve. The Balloonist: the Story of T.S.C. Lowe-- Inventor, Scientist, Magician, and Father of the U.S. Air Force. Savannah, GA: Frederic C. Beil, 2007. Print.